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Essays Philosophy Religion & Spirituality

The Critique of Spiritual Reason

Introduction

Growing up Mormon, I often heard people talk about spiritual experiences. There is a near-endless variety of these experiences, from the classic example of Joseph Smith’s First Vision to strange dreams of angels, to exorbitant narratives of Mormon garments deflecting bullets in a warzone, to small simple feelings in church, to tingly sensations, to more abstract and conceptual sense of confirmation. For Mormons (LDS people), these experiences are created by the Holy Ghost, and are evidence of God’s presence on Earth. I found these stories fascinating to listen to (although there were many that seemed trite and cliched). Even after leaving the church, I’ve been intrigued by fringe experiences in the human condition: transformative experiences, moments of inspiration, paradigm-breaking realizations, imaginings, visions, dreams, and beyond. Like William James, I’m amazed at the varieties of religious and spiritual experience, and I want to participate in the monumental project of exploring, documenting, and explaining them. What are they? How do they happen? What do they mean, and how can we interpret them? What can they tell us?

I have had many powerful experiences that challenged my understanding of reality, inspired me, and left me reeling to understand. In my own internal language, they are window-shattering moments. For me, these experiences create aporia: an impasse, a quandary one cannot resolve, a state of puzzlement, a doubting and bewilderment, a being-at-a-loss, a dazzling of the mind by the intricacy of existence. (I discuss aporia and similar topics in depth in Why Literature Matters: The Aporetic Approach). At first, because I had spent hundreds of hours in Mormon Sunday schools and seminaries, and I was indoctrinated into this religious tradition, I couldn’t help but interpret these experiences in the only way I knew how – in a way that reinforced the LDS belief system.

However, I started to realize there are serious problems with the way LDS people, and perhaps religious people in general, understand, talk about, and make inferences from these spiritual experiences. As an ever-skeptical and philosophical kid, I couldn’t take the experiences for granted and just naively subsume them into the LDS worldview. Further, I had a few experiences that broke the mold that Mormonism sets. I cannot hope to describe them in detail, but their context explains a lot. Many of them occurred in India. One was at a Hindu ceremony on the bank of the river Ganges, one was reading the Bhagavad Gita & Fight Club during a 17-hour train ride from New Delhi to Varanasi, and one was practicing the salah (Muslim form of prayer) and reading the Qu’ran. Later on, I had several episodes of bipolar mania that felt like a continuous chain of all-consuming, overwhelming, and beautiful spiritual experiences chained together for days or weeks at a time. These experiences were much more intense and undeniable than the relatively mild experiences I felt in a Mormon context.

This gave me many questions. If, as I was told, spiritual emotions while reading the Book of Mormon meant that the LDS Church was true, then does that mean that Islam or Hinduism are true because of these experiences? How can this be the case, when these religious have clearly contradictory beliefs, prescriptions, and interpretations of the world? How am I supposed to distinguish between “true” or “valid” spiritual experiences and episodes of mental illness, when they feel extremely similar, and the manias are often even more acute, prolonged, and even more structured and sensible? Since these experiences don’t have a clear, obvious, reflexive, or undeniable interpretation, and don’t merely ‘explain themselves’ or stand on their own, they must be interpreted somehow. What inferences should we make from them? What beliefs should we hold or what actions should we take based on them? What do they justify and support? What information do they give us or fail to give us?

I began to ask these questions. But my teachers, mentors, and even trained LDS religious scholars did not truly understand or engage with my objections. Instead of seriously and closely listening, reflecting on my questions, and giving me genuine and thoughtful responses, they often denied my experience or told me I should not even ask the questions. They often told me I was thinking too much, should “just have faith,” or should avoid reading any non-Mormon scholarly literature or thoughts. This just made me more skeptical and interested in digging into the questions. The more I thought, the more it seemed clear that the Church was wrong about spiritual experience, and that people were making far too many and resting far too many. Their faith was on a fundamentally shaky foundation, and instead of investigating the foundations they simply ignored them. Take out the crucial load-bearing keystone of their interpretation of spiritual experiences, and the entire belief system collapsed. Ultimately, this was the primary reason I decided to leave Mormonism at 15, although there are many other reasons to reject the religion’s claims. Here, almost a decade later, I will try to dig into these questions and explain the problems.

Ostler on Faith

One of the few people to engage with the questions of spiritual experiences in detail and in good faith is Blake Ostler, a prominent LDS theologian. Faith, Reason, & Spiritual Experience, he gives an argument for why spiritual experiences provide justification for faith. Ostler is not at his best as a philosopher here though. He fails to state his premises and assumptions in detail, show most of his logical work, or address the obvious objections to his arguments. I wish that LDS people and apologists understood their doubters more and engaged with them more directly and thoroughly. Unfortunately, dialogue on Mormonism is often more like ships passing in the night.

Still, it is refreshing to see Mormon theology addressed in a more rigorous philosophical way, including how these ideas interface with common problems in epistemology. Ostler begins with the foundational framing that “no argument can prove spiritual experiences, because the direct encounter with the divine will always be more basic and grounded —and frankly more compelling—than any other evidence or argument.” This is difficult to respond to. How can you know if you are having a genuine ‘encounter with the divine’? How can you know what to take from this encounter? Many people claim (and I accept they have truly had) these kinds of experiences, and they take radically different conclusions from them. Further, why do these experiences take epistemic priority? Why are they the most basic form of knowledge?

Ostler is making a massive claim here without any elaboration or sufficient justification. In philosophy, debates on what form of knowledge is most fundamental have taken up thousands of years and millions of pages, and he cannot simply bypass any of these questions by stating his claim without justification to an accepting audience. Further, in a talk that is supposed to show how spiritual experiences support faith, he seems to be skipping to the end, begging the question, undermining his own case, and making a circular argument. If his initial premise is that spiritual experiences are unprovable but override all other forms of argument or evidence, then what is the point of continuing to make the argument that spiritual experiences justify faith in Mormonism?

I appreciate that Ostler describes the epistemic structure of a Mormon spiritual experience with 6 characteristics – (1) cognitive and affective, (2) non-volitional, (3) familiarity, (4) presence of a loving being, (5) indescribable positive emotion (joy/peace/sweetness), (6) re-orienting all other experience. What constitutes a spiritual experience is rarely described in detail and is usually extremely vague (often intentionally, so that anything can be classed as a spiritual experience that supports the Church’s truth-claims). Part of the reason I appreciate his detailed description is that it makes it easier to understand and address the epistemic problems with this view of spiritual experiences. See below:

In Mormon epistemic practice, the experience of the spiritual knowledge often is described as including some or all of the following facets:

1. The experience cannot be reduced to a mere emotion or feeling. It involves a cognitive component essentially. Doctrine & Covenants 9:7-8 suggests that a precursor to such experiences requires studying out the questions at issue: “Behold, you have not understood; you supposed that I would give it [the answer to your questions] unto you, when you took no thought save it were to ask me. But, behold, I say unto you that you must study it out in your mind. . .” In addition, one must “ask me if it be right.” The scripture then predicts the form that the spiritual response will take: “. . . if it is right I will cause that your bosom shall burn with you; therefore, you shall feel that it is right. But if it be not right you shall have no such feelings, but you shall have a stupor of thought that shall cause you to forget the thing which is wrong” (9:8-9). The experience is both cognitive and affective; both head and heart. As Doctrine & Covenants 8:2 clarifies: “I will tell you in your mind and in your heart, by the Holy Ghost, which shall come upon you and which shall dwell in your heart.” The burning in the bosom, or heart, or very center of the human soul, is affective and involves feelings, but it also involves a sense of pure knowledge and enlightenment. Most often the experience of sensing the truthfulness of the message comes in the midst of such a search. The answers often come in conjunction with sincere study, searching and thoughtful pondering.

2. The spiritual experience cannot be produced at will but is experienced as coming as a grace in the midst an honest search for the truth.

3. It involves a sense of having always known – it is deeply familiar.

4. It involves more than just cognitive or discursive knowledge (sapere); it also involves interpersonal knowledge or conoscere and associated with a sense of the presence of a loving and personal being and being accepted in a relationship. This “knowing God as an interpersonal presence in one’s own life and being” is, at least theologically, the most important spiritual aspect of the experience because to “know God” in this sense is life eternal. Indeed, to know that we are accepted into relationship with God and to invite God to reside in our hearts is a moment of justification by grace through faith and the beginning of the life of sanctification in which the spirit enters into us and Christ takes up abode in us in the process of Christification, or being conformed to the image of Christ, and culminating in deification.

5. The feeling of a “burning” in the heart includes a feeling of indescribable joy, peace and sweetness.

6. The experience re-orients all other experience. Everything is seen in a new light through the lens of the experiential knowledge.

— Blake Ostler, Faith, Reason, & Spiritual Experience – Vol 5

There are many problems with this framework.

First, Ostler isn’t clear whether these criteria are necessary, sufficient, and/or both for constituting a spiritual experience. Must genuine spiritual experiences have all six, some of them, or just one? It is not perfectly clear exactly what he is claiming.

Second, many of the spiritual experiences I’ve heard described in an LDS context don’t meet these criteria. Things often talked about in testimony meetings, like finding your keys after praying and feeling relieved, feeling a vague sense of calmness or peace while reading the BoM, or feeling intense joy after carrying a handcart up a hill – these aren’t enough, and aren’t really valid or complete spiritual experiences for Ostler. Many people in the church have *never* had a spiritual experience that sufficiently meets these criteria, which under Ostler’s own framework would mean they don’t have a sufficient basis for faith in the church. Yet I doubt he would tell these people that they should not have faith, which seems to bare an inconsistency in his worldview.

Third, these criteria are far too permissive to support faith in the LDS church specifically. People often have experiences that match these criteria, in an innumerable variety of contexts. Billions of people have spiritual experiences that they then interpret very differently, supporting their faith in radically different worldviews. Ostler must not only show how spiritual experiences can justify faith in general. He also must show that spiritual experiences can justify faith in Mormonism specifically and solely and exclude faith in other contradictory or competitive religious or faith systems. Of course, he fails to do this — likely because it is not possible.

Additionally, many kinds of experiences—episodes of mental illness, psychedelic experiences, responses to art and music, and even feelings in survival circumstances or under intense physical exertion (like runner’s highs) — could fulfill these criteria. Certain chemical substances and drugs, especially the classical psychedelics like LSD, DMT, 5-MeO-DMT, and psilocybin, can reliably (almost always) induce experiences that fulfill Ostler’s criteria to a remarkable degree (Barrett & Griffiths 2017). They can do so far more reliably than LDS-related practices like prayer, Church worship, scripture reading, and the temple. Does this mean that psychonauts are justified in having faith in the conclusions they take from their often-strange and reality-bending experiences, or that bipolar people in manic episodes are justified in having faith in the content of their manias? Since Ostler’s criteria fail to exclude these types of experience, he is logically implicated in defending these claims. He has to accept that they are equally justified in their faith based upon spiritual experience as LDS people are in theirs. Further, if one’s degree of faith should be proportional to the intensity of the experience or the degree to which it fulfills the criteria, he may have to accept that these people are even more justified in their faith.

In the end, Ostler fails to make a satisfying or complete case. He concludes with an argument that there is “no way to distinguish between the phenomenal nature of experiences directly caused by God and knowledge based on memory or sensory experience.” I was surprised to see this statement, because it clearly undermines Ostler’s entire case. If there is no way to distinguish between God-caused experiences and normal sensory experiences, then there is no way to know if an experience is a genuine religious inspiration or not. The true promptings from the Holy Ghost, the true messages from God, are indistinguishable from meaningless sensory impressions and thoughts, like pebbles of gold lost in the fast-moving, endless stream of sensory and mental experiences. Thus, it is impossible to know what to have faith in. Trying to build a foundation of faith on this slippery, shifting, swirling surface is unworkable.

Gold Panning on Upper Sand Creek, by watercolor artist Richard DuBois -  DuBoisWatercolorExpressions.com
Panning for Gold, by Richard DuBois

Ostler then describes how faith is fundamentally subjective and internal to the individual, because it is (1) passionate, (2) has a unique subjective interpretative stance, (3) is a choice, (4) is a matter of the heart, and (5) is a non-willed gift from God. This roughly matches Kierkegaard’s conception of faith, which will discuss and critique shortly. However, here Ostler sets himself up for failure. Faith is meant to be something that can support decisions, providing a basis for a life-path and a belief system. It is also supposed to allow many people to arrive at the same conclusions independently (e.g. that the LDS Church is true). But if it is this radically subjective, emotional, intense form of knowing, one which is chosen in a kind of arbitrary leap, it seems extremely doubtful that faith can fulfill these desiderata.

Further Questions

I have only touched on the surface of these questions and addressed one of the more popular defenses of spiritual experiences in Mormonism. Here are a few more questions that I find crucially important and that are often ignored or misunderstood:

Faith as a choice or leap

Let’s say faith is a choice. This is a common claim in religion, an oft-repeated phrase in Mormonism, and a key premise in Ostler’s argument. But there many things that one could choose to have faith in. Many of these things are contradictory or competitive, and you cannot have faith in all of them at the same time. Thus, one must choose between them. On what basis do you make that choice?

Even Kierkegaard, the most prominent philosopher of faith and one of my favorite thinkers, fails to give an adequate analysis of what to have faith in. He claims that we cannot have faith by virtue of reason and must suspend our reason to believe in something higher than reason (SEP). This is a form of fideism, the epistemological position that faith is independent of reason. (Though Kierkegaard is characteristically contradictory here, as he uses reason to justify his claim that we cannot have faith in in virtue of reason). Faith is simply a leap into the unknown and unknowable, a radical decision made in response to the absurdity and ambiguity of the human condition. He sees faith as an unexplainable miracle, where eternal truth enters time in an instant and witnesses of God.

But where should one leap? In what direction? How does one tell between the eternal truths worth leaping for, and the contingent or potentially false ideas and beliefs that should be avoided or more tentatively walked into? He seems to take it as a foregone conclusion that if one has faith, it would be in Christianity. Why, if not just his upbringing and cultural biases? Why not take a leap of faith into Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, new-age spiritualism, fascism, Marxism, scientism, or any other system of belief? Is the choice just arbitrary, random, and unfounded?

Further, why leap into any culturally created system of belief at all, rather than just having faith in disconnected ideas or principles? After all, the “will to a system is a lack of integrity” (Nietzsche). Once you decide to embrace a complete system, the experiences, evidence, and ideas that do not fit into your system will be rejected, ignored, or forced to fit into the system. You are no longer an authentic and serious investigator, seeking to interpret reality, understand experiences for their own sake, and make an inquiry into life and the world in a pursuit of truth. You are now attached to a rigid, preexisting belief system and set of concepts. When this system becomes ingrained in your mind by decades of acceptance and practice, it defines your social relations, and it shapes how you live your life every day, it becomes a herculean task to leave it. The cognitive dissonance becomes too powerful. There is a very real sense in which your brain will not let you escape the system. Further, the social and personal costs of leaving a system you have built your life around can be too much to bear. This is why Nietzsche urges us to avoid systems, to always be open to new evidence and experience, and to be able to hold contradictions in your mind without forcing them to resolve into one side or the other to fit some static framework.

Leap of Faith Painting by Brady Nielson | Saatchi Art
Leap of Faith, painting by Brady Nielson.

It is telling that Kierkegaard’s paradigm example of a leap of faith (a phrase he does not actually use in his corpus) is the story of Abraham nearly sacrificing his son, Isaac. He does this precisely because it is such a radical decision (killing your child), made entirely on the basis of Abraham’s faith and his spiritual experience of God speaking to him. He uses this story to show that the religious sphere of existence transcends or exceeds rationality and morality. But what if instead of Abraham, it was Osama bin Laden, who believed on the basis of his Islamic faith and his spiritual experiences that he should orchestrate the 9/11 attacks? This case differs from Abraham in degree, and in its cultural associations, but it does not seem fundamentally different in kind. There are an infinite number of actions that one could take on the basis of one’s faith or spiritual experiences, where many of these actions any reasonable person would consider completely unacceptable, but a faith-based person would see as potentially acceptable or even essential. Why take one specific faith-inspired action over any other? Further, a constitutive component of faith for Kierkegaard is that it is totally embraced, without doubt or rational criticism. Abraham does not stop to ask how he knows that God is speaking to him, to think that perhaps he is hallucinating or mishearing, or to wonder if he is misinterpreting what God’s intentions are. These would be unfaithful questions. Instead, he just acts. Thus, the idea of a leap of faith leaves us open to amoral, irrational actions that can result in atrocities and catastrophes. Personally, I would hate to live in a world where people acted on this idea.

Rembrant, Abraham and Isaac

Perhaps Kierkegaard’s view of faith is more understandable when you understand his idea of truth. See below:

“An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an existing individual…The truth is precisely the venture which chooses an objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite.  I contemplate the order of nature in the hope of finding God, and I see omnipotence and wisdom; but I also see much else that disturbs my mind and excites anxiety.  The sum of all this is an objective uncertainty.  But it is for this very reason that the inwardness becomes as intense as it is, for it embraces this objective uncertainty with the entire passion of the infinite …Without risk there is no faith.  Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual’s inwardness and the objective uncertainty.”

Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 182.

This is an extremely complex passage that only explains Kierkegaard’s view in part. But in short, he sees life as objectively uncertain: the world is ambiguous, hard to interpret, and there is not an entirely objective or verifiable system that can tell us exactly what the truth is and what we should believe and do. However, any existing, living person must still take actions and have beliefs. We cannot simply sit back in a passive, agnostic, unmoving state of purgatory and suspension, like Dostoevsky’s Underground Man. Not only is that a life-negating and depressing outcome (a resignation to the deathworld), the passivity and agnosticism is also itself a kind of action that implies certain beliefs (e.g. that no action is worth taking). Taking no actions whatsoever, holding no beliefs at all, is impossible for human beings. Therefore, we must make choices and hold beliefs despite our uncertainties. Kierkegaard’s solution is faith. We must choose some uncertainty to hold fast with a passionate conviction. We make our choices based on this conviction, acting and believing despite the risk.

This is a compelling and profound description of the human condition, and I mostly agree with it. However, Kierkegaard runs into the same problem again here: faith provides no decision criterion, or a way to choose between beliefs. It only provides a way to hold an already-decided-upon belief. Faith cannot stand on its own. By itself, it is only a teetering, aimless toddler, without direction or foundation. As the case of Abraham and Osama above shows, it matters which uncertain beliefs and ideas that we decide to appropriate into our being and hold with the most passionate inwardness. We cannot just seize upon any old uncertainty and develop an intense faith in it – or at least we should not. So how do we choose? Whatever we choose, there will be an implicit criterion or framework at play, something that determines how we evaluate our options and decide amongst them.

What evaluative framework should we use to choose what to have faith in, what to believe? This is an enormous question, the fundamental question of epistemology, and I cannot answer it here. But I would argue that some of the best frameworks include logic and reason, the evidence of experience, and authentic love for others. The answer is certainly not faith, because that would just leave us where we started again. It is circular and arbitrary to choose what to have faith in on the basis of faith. Conclusively, faith is just a thin cover for other systems. Once you peel back the cover and see behind the curtains, it turns out faith is empty. It is a group of other systems in a trench coat. Upon investigation and reflection, faith dissolves into nothingness or devolves into other things, providing no real guidance. While faith may be necessary for practical action, and it is important for living a meaningful and coherent life, it does not itself provide us with any reasons to choose. It is the conclusion of the decision process, the step that must be taken once you have already decided what uncertainties to believe in.

Faith in the good

Should we have faith in ‘what is good’? Let’s say a paradigm religious or LDS person, call her Sophie, wants to have faith because she believes what she has faith in is “good” or morally valuable. But how does she know that what she has faith in is good, and how does she know what constitutes the Good itself? In other words, where does Sophie get her normative and moral beliefs? By saying that she has faith in what is good, she is applying her pre-existing moral framework (her understanding of what is good). This assumes that she already has a sufficient basis for that moral framework, and that it can stand independently from her faith. But I think the answer is that Sophie, the typical religious person, gets most or all of her moral beliefs from faith as well – from her religion or her spiritual experiences. Thus, she is using the moral beliefs she got from faith to assess her faith. This is circular logic. She is using the system of faith to evaluate itself. A faith based upon the good is an illusory solution that swallows its own tail.

A common phrase in Mormonism is “what is good is of God” (call this Alma’s formula). This comes from Alma 5:40 in the Book of Mormon, where the prophet Alma declares: “For I say unto you that whatsoever is good cometh from God, and whatsoever is evil cometh from the devil.” Countless times, when I asked about faith, or questioned how we can know if something is a genuine spiritual experience or a real inspiration from God, this was the answer I was given. However, this is a vacuous non-answer. After all, it presumes that we already know what is good and what is evil or bad. In philosophical terms, it assumes that we have reliable normative knowledge. But we don’t. Morality and decision-making are complex and is often unclear what is good, or even what it means for something to be good. People have conflicting moral intuitions, beliefs, and reasoning processes, and it is not obvious who is right (see the disagreement on trolley problem dilemmas). In other words, this logic of faith bypasses an entire field of philosophy (metaethics) and ignores an enormous and vital area of human thought, brushing it aside without reflection.

What is good may be of God, but how do we know what is good? Does God tell us somehow? If so, then how do we know if the things we think are God’s guidance are truly of God? Perhaps we can be mistaken about what is good, and what is of God. For instance, I think most people would agree that Osama bin Laden was mistaken that he was guided by God, and that the papal legate Arnaud Amalric was mistaken when he ordered all the heretics of Béziers to be slaughtered, saying “Kill them all. God will know his own.” (See The Ideology of Anti-Heretical Crusade in the 1838 Mormon War). The problem of figuring out what is good is not trivial and cannot be bypassed, and it is a matter of life or death what answers we choose. Alma naively ignores this problem.

Additionally, the formula “what is good is of God” reveals how empty or useless faith and spiritual experience are as decision criteria. In most cases where people are seeking answers from God (or whatever spiritual/religious entity they believe in), they are asking precisely because they are unsure what to do, and don’t know what the good option or right choice is. They are in a state of aporia or uncertainty with respect to the good. If they knew what was good already, they wouldn’t be asking God. For instance, perhaps someone is unsure about what college or job would be right for them. How does “what is good of God” help there? This creates a dilemma with two sharp horns, a catch-22. In any serious and difficult case where a decision must be made, faith and spiritual experience are completely unhelpful. Since you don’t know what is good, Alma’s formula is an almost insultingly pointless. Trying to determine what experiences might be genuinely spiritual (“of God”) is impossible, since you can only tell what is of God if you already know what is good. On the other hand, in the easier, more trivial and obvious cases where it is already clear what the good option is, you don’t need to resort to faith or call upon spiritual experiences at all. You can avoid consulting them entirely and leave them by the wayside, like blind guides at a crossroads that cannot help any lost traveler. Therefore, faith is either useless or irrelevant for decision-making.

The Road not taken by Michael Bosnar
The Road Not Taken by Michael Bosnar. The good path might seem obvious, but in real life this is rarely the case – and the thrust of Robert Frost’s poem is that the ‘good road’ is only clear in retrospect.

Conclusion

These are a sample of some of my most important recurring thoughts on faith and spiritual experiences. I’ve been thinking many of these things since I was 13 or 14, but this is the first place I have written them down in detail. I hope this helps explain why I find faith and spiritual experiences utterly unsatisfying, and why I am frustrated and disappointed by most discussions on them. For the things that serve as the foundations for many people’s entire lives, that shape every decision they make, it is shocking how rarely these people reflect deeply and thoroughly on faith and spirituality. If they did, I think they would reach the same conclusions I have. Faith is important, and spiritual experiences are a powerful and beautiful dimension of human life. They are both valuable in many ways. However, they cannot serve as the foundations of a belief system or as a criterion for decisions and actions. Spiritual experiences alone do not justify faith, and faith alone does not provide a way to make choices and hold beliefs in an uncertain world.

Categories
Essays History Religion & Spirituality

The Ideology of Anti-Heretical Crusade in the 1838 Mormon War

“Up, awake, ye defenders of Zion!
The foe’s at the door of your homes;
Let each heart be the
heart of a lion,
Unyielding and proud as he roams.
Remember the
trials of Missouri;
Forget not the courage of Nauvoo…
Tho, assisted by
legions infernal,
The plundering foemen advance,
With a host from the regions eternal
We’ll scatter their troops at a glance
By His power is Zion surrounded;
Her warriors are noble and brave,
And their
faith on Jehovah is founded,
Whose power is mighty to save.”

“Up, Awake, Ye Defenders of Zion,” Mormon hymn (c. 1848)

Framing

“Come, come, ye saints, no toil nor labor fear,” urges “perhaps the best-known and most beloved”[1] Mormon hymn, for “why should we think to earn a great reward / If we now shun the fight?”[2] Penned by LDS poet William Clayton, these compelling lines reflect the zeitgeist of the Mormon community in the wake of its violent expulsion from America and the harrowing pilgrimage across the plains to the new Zion in Utah (then within Mexico). The underlying ideology of the anthem is reminiscent of the crusade theology of Pope Innocent III as expressed in the quia maior, the call to the Fifth Crusade:

“So rouse yourselves, most beloved sons…gird yourselves for the service of the Crucified One, not hesitating to risk your possessions and your persons for him who laid down his life and shed his blood for you…sure that if you are truly penitent you will achieve eternal rest as a profit from this temporal labour.”[3]

Pope Innocent III, Quia Maior

The parallels between these two religious calls-to-action are clear. Both Innocent and Clayton implore listeners to plunge into a spiritual or literal fight, overcoming suffering for the sake of religious ideals. These texts are microcosms of broader patterns in crusades targeted against ‘heretical’ Christians.

My fundamental claim is that the rhetoric of both sides in the 1838 Mormon War exhibited the signature strategies of Innocent III’s ideology of anti-heretical crusade. In this context, ideology is the disparate set of “ideas, values, and accepted ‘truths’ of the culture that enabled – consciously and unconsciously – holy war.”[4] Ideology is the prism through which the culture views and interprets the world. Both the Albigensian Crusade and the 1838 Mormon War exhibit the same ideological elements despite being separated by six hundred years. I will demonstrate the resonance between these periods by uncovering common methods and worldviews in the primary sources, including: Innocent III’s quia maior and papal documents from the period of the Albigensian Crusade (1209 – 1229 AD), anti-Mormon rhetoric and Governor Bogg’s extermination order, sermons by key Mormon figure Sidney Rigdon and the founder Joseph Smith, and Mormon scripture in the Doctrine & Covenants.

These sources indicate common trends in the ways Christians portray and motivate action against rival movements within the faith. In other words, the significant actors in both periods wielded the same invisible weapons.[5] Using these weapons of ideas, Christians like Innocent III were able to manufacture consent for atrocity and bloodshed against fellow people of the faith. Together, these ideological tools compose an ideology of anti-heretical crusade: religious purification of the Christian community, the imitatio Christi, and the reclamation of the Christian inheritance – an actual Jerusalem or an imagined Zion.

Ideology of Innocent III

Innocent IIi, 1161-1216 Painting by Granger
A woodcut of Innocent III from the 12th century.

The central currents of the crusading ideology of Innocent III, arguably the most influential pope in history,[6] can be summarized in three words: purification, imitation, reclamation. Innocent unleashed a seismic ideological shift that turned the Crusades inward, against targets within Christendom. To accomplish this change, Innocent III forged an armory of rhetorical weapons and “progressively augmented the spiritual benefits to be gained by suppressing heresy.”[7] Papal documents of the early 13th century establish this trend.

Purification is rooting out toxic elements within the Christian community. The Albigensian Crusade and the Fourth Lateran Council were both components of Innocent’s endeavor to “purify Christian society at home.”[8] The zeal to eliminate the heathens partially arose from the same motivation for eradicating a virus: to prevent spread. Innocent warned a Provençal archbishop that the Cathars would “seduce the hearts of listeners” and lure them all into “pit of perdition together.”[9] In his letters he often used the imagery of infection, calling the enemy “pestilential,”[10] a disease that must be eliminated so that the “body of Christ may be built up until we all reach unity.”[11] Thus, Innocent called a crusade against the perceived blasphemous virus, and gave an ultimatum to the Langedouc heretics: renounce or perish.[12] His ideology portrayed purifying crusades as necessary to keep the Christian body intact and uncontaminated.

Imitation is the call to mimic the Messiah. Innocent used the ideological potency of this imitatio christi to instill in Christians a desire to suffer the Passion as crusaders. In the quia maior, Innocent declares the Fifth Crusade “on behalf of him who when dying cried with a loud voice on the cross,”[13] showing that the figurehead of Catholicism himself would also seek to imitate Christ. He likened the sacrifices of the crucesignati to the way the Son of God gave his blood and his life. Innocent even proclaims that true crusaders can be “equally certain” as Christ himself in receiving the ultimate reward — eternal salvation.[14] The final line declares that crusaders are “acting in the office of Christ’s legation.”[15] Comparison to Christ, the imagery of Jesus’ afflictions on the cross, and supplications to emulate and fight for the Messiah proved to be potent pieces of ideological equipment in justifying crusades.

Finally, reclamation is the attempt to recapture the sacred Christian inheritance of the Holy Land and Jerusalem. As Innocent sermonized: “snatch the land that Your only begotten son consecrated with his own blood from the hands of the enemy of the cross and restore it to Christian worship.”[16] Innocent decreed that Psalm 79 should be sung across Europe, echoing the drive to rescue the holy “inheritance” from the “heathens” in the name of the “only-begotten son.”[17] In this view, the Levant was rightful Christian soil, and the crusades were a matter of recovery, not conquest. Jerusalem was seen as the “navel of the world” by medieval Christians, who portrayed the land of Christ’s ministry as “fruitful above others, like another paradise of delights.”[18] Crusade was essential to save the sacrosanct and precious lands of Christ from defilement.

Parallels

The remainder of the paper will reveal the symmetries between Innocent’s anti-heretical crusading ideology and the rhetoric of the 1838 conflict. These similarities are revealed by comparing Innocent’s key papal bulls with the critical documents surrounding the 1838 Mormon War. In casualties, this war was somewhat insignificant: less than thirty individuals perished directly because of the conflict.[19] However, almost 175 years later, it is clear “the trauma of the Missouri experience dramatically shaped the development of Mormon theology, community, family, and ideology.”[20] The violence has an outsized impact on the Mormon historical memory.

Reclamation of Zion

Above: the sharing of sacred land in the Abrahamic holy city Jerusalem and the Mormon site of Independence, MO.[21]

Both Catholic crusaders and Mormon pioneers sought to reclaim a lost promised land. The crusaders battled for the Holy Land in the Levant. The Mormons recognized the sanctity of the original Jerusalem, but they also struggled to find or build a New Jerusalem in America. In these efforts, Missouri is paramount as “the land which I [God] have appointed and consecrated for the gathering of the saints,” and because Independence is the “city of Zion.”[22] There is an entire sacred landscape based in Missouri. The state contains many of Mormonism’s hallowed sites, including Far West, “the spot where Cain killed Abel,”[23] the Kirtland Temple, the location of many of Joseph Smith’s prophetic visions and revelations,[24] and Adam-ondi-Ahman,[25] where Joseph believed Adam and Eve lived after their Fall from the Garden of Eden.[26] Just as the Abrahamic ‘people of the book’ try to share the holy sites of Jerusalem, three different Mormon denominations share the sacred land of Independence.[27] Thus, analogous to the recurring Catholic crusades to seize Jerusalem from the 11th to 15th centuries, the conflicts over Missouri in the 1830s held immense gravity for Mormons. The quest to control sacred soil was at the foreground of religious warfare both in Missouri and medieval Europe.

Preaching that “God would deliver Zion into the Saints’ hands by destroying the wicked,” some influential members of the LDS Church believed that a “Mormon takeover of Jackson County was preordained.”[28] Rumors of an impending conquest by an unfamiliar religious sect and “publicized declarations of divine entitlement to Missouri lands” spurred outrage and fear amongst the locals.[29] In response, anti-Mormon throngs brutally ejected the Mormons. Assembling an armed force called Zion’s Camp, some LDS leaders tried to retake the lost sacred land, but this expedition fizzled out without bloodshed.[30] Eventually, the church migrated to Far West.

However, the refugees faced similar problems in their new settlement. Some of their neighbors sent terrified letters to the governor claiming that the ‘fanatics’ were cooperating with “Indians of various tribes” to “work the general destruction of all that are not Mormons.”[31] Tensions soon surpassed a breaking point. Early Mormon authors wrote that a mob stormed into Far West in 1833 with a scarlet flag “in token of blood,” and announced that “the Mormons must leave the county en masse or that every man shall be put to death.”[32] The Mormons argued that their enemies used ideological weapons “to stir up the murky pool of popular prejudice to a crusade against a peaceable, prosperous, and law-abiding people.”[33] The reclamation rhetoric of the Mormons, and their imagination of a new Zion in Missouri, may have partially instigated a violent backlash. Ultimately, the Mormons were banished.

Joseph Young affidavit for Haun's Mill massacre | Special ...
Artwork based on the massacre at Haun’s Mill. Painting by C.C.A. Christensen

The tragedy of the loss of Zion is an immense legacy in the Mormon historical memory. Some contemporary Mormon sources referenced Psalm 79, the verses which served as the primary raw material in crafting Innocent’s crusade calls. One poet cited the Psalm in the first page of his poem lamenting the expulsion from Missouri: “Our eyes are dim, our hearts heavy / No place of refuge being left.”[34] This is also evocative of Innocent’s frequent references to Lamentations 5, which weeps that “our inheritance has been handed over to strangers…we have lost that land which the Lord consecrated.”[35] Many LDS hymns extol the effort to restore Zion or to establish a New Jerusalem.[36] As the verse on the front cover of this paper attests, Mormons cannot forget the trials of Missouri any more than medieval Christians could forget the 637 AD capture of Jerusalem.

The Mormons responded to the violence with a shift in ideology. The relentless reprisals against the faithful “spurred the radicalization of Mormon theology in the early 1840s.”[37] During the conflict, Joseph preached to troops assembled at Far West “that the kingdom of God should be set up, and should never fall,” declaring that “the Lord would send angels, who would fight for us; and that we should be victorious.”[38] After Rigdon argued that dissenting members of the Church should “be trodden under foot of men”[39] in his ‘Salt Sermon,’ some Mormons organized a vigilante militarist group called the Danites. The Danites believed they had a duty to take the land of Missouri, “that it was the will of God they should do so; and that the Lord would give them power to possess the kingdom.”[40] While they rarely engaged in actual conflict, this paramilitary group served as the ideological shock troops in the Mormon counter-crusade against the Missourians.

After all, according to doctrine, the Missourians were gentiles occupying territory divinely granted to “the remnant of Jacob” (e.g. Native Americans) and “heirs according to the covenant” (e.g. Mormons) as “the land of [their] inheritance.”[41] As official LDS scripture given by Joseph Smith in 1831 states: “ye shall assemble yourselves together to rejoice upon the land of Missouri, which is the land of your inheritance, which is now the land of your enemies.”[42] This is almost identical to the phraseology Innocent III repeatedly used to motivate crusading: from commanding Christians to “free…his inheritance from the hands of the Saracens”[43] in the post miserable of 1198 to his oft-cited Psalm 78: “the gentiles have invaded your inheritance.”[44] In both contexts, portraying the land as a religious heritage rather than mere conquerable territory was vital in motivating violent action to regain the venerated places.

Imitation

Rio De Janeiro Brazil

During the skirmishes of the 1830s, Mormon soldiers sometimes announced their arrival with the “trumpet tones [of] the old Jewish battle-cry, ‘The sword of the Lord and of Gideon.’”[45] This practice and many others underscore the ways the combatants of the Missouri conflict sought to imitate Christ, saints or historical Christians, and scriptural heroes. In this conflict, Smith unsheathed his rhetorical sword, and declared to his early disciples that “I will lead you to the battle.”[46] The imitatio Christi proved to be an essential element in encouraging the defense of Zion.

The language of crusade was quickly adopted in 1838 to instill a sense of the significance of the conflict and inspire analogies to Christ and the persecuted saints of history. W.W. Phelps, a writer of many key Mormon hymns, said at the time that “the crisis has come,” and that “nothing but the power of God can stop the mob in their Latter Day crusade against the church of Christ.”[47] After 1838, there was a “massive outpouring of writings and petitions describing the violence,” and Mormons argued that their oppressors were like “the tormentors of the ancient saints,” even “portraying Boggs as Nero.”[48] Sometimes, Mormon rhetoricians “used the memory of persecution to justify violence.”[49] These trends indicate the way Mormon figures drew continuities between their own situation and the situation of the Christlike saints and their enemies.

Crusader rhetoric was not just applied to vindicate Mormons, but to vilify their foes. In line with the Mormon belief, secular onlooker Thomas Kane sought to defend the Mormon’s image to counter the “‘Holy War’ waged against them by evangelical America.”[50] This rhetorical method proved invaluable. One LDS author satirized the anti-Mormon use of crusader rhetoric, saying that it was abundantly clear the Missouri militiamen were “worthy scions of the old [crusader] stock, and members of this honorable fraternity.”[51] The ironist describes how one Missourian “pursued them till the blood gushed from their feet,” “burning and destroying heretic’s houses,” and thus “redeemed himself in true evangelical style.”[52] This author’s use of ‘evangelical’ as an insult is remindful of the way Arab or Muslim sources use the term ‘crusader’ to impugn foreign invaders. Clearly, representations of holy warriors can be positive or negative, depending on if those depicted are allies to those doing the depicting.

Two Thousand Stripling Warriors by Arnold Friberg, a famous piece of LDS art.

Hymns are critical in ideological conflicts; a Mormon author wrote that a “hymnbook is as good an index to the brains and to the hearts of a people as the creed book.”[53] These invisible armaments often surpassed physical weapons in effectiveness. A medieval historian wrote that the enemies of the crusaders in the Languedoc “feared those who sang more than those who fought.”[54]  Expressing similar sentiments to the Mormon hymn cited on the front page, the Catholic hymn Veni creator spiritus was widely adopted by crusaders during the Albigensian Crusade:

Far from us drive our deadly foe;
true peace unto us bring;
and through all perils lead us safe
beneath thy sacred wing.[55]

The Mormon lyricist also extolled his LDS audience to remember they were by “his power in Zion surrounded,” even as “legions infernal” and “plundering foemen” advanced against them. This example shows that both groups used the same lyrical methods to glorify spiritual or physical crusades and place them into a context of religious symbols. Especially impactful in both periods were the ideas, language, and emblems of the imitation of Christ.

Purification

closeup photo of white petaled flower

Like the Catholicism of 13th-century Europe, the Protestantism of 19th-century America “required that communities be whole, an ideal that demanded the removal of social deviants.”[56] In the views of some, this merited the destruction of Mormonism and other aberrations. The drive to extinguish difference also reflects an underlying Christian persecuting society, which partly arose from the “fear of schism [that] had attended the church since its infancy.”[57] Like Innocent III, American preachers of the early 1800s also confronted an ever-splintering variety of divergent Christian movements. To contend effectively amongst religious discord, some revived the anti-heretical methods of the medieval enforcers of Christian orthodoxy.

Mormonism was not an isolated target of persecution. The attacks against Masons, Catholics, and Mormons, and Jews in the US at the dawn of the 19th century were manifestations of a “subsurface current of American thought” which at any time could “erupt in a geyser of hostility upon a tight-knit minority.”[58] These persecuting movements had a common base of support in “New England, the rural areas, and the Protestant ministers,” and “a great part of the propaganda against the Mormons was carried on through books and sermons of Protestant ministers.”[59] Anti-Mormonism was a wave in a larger tide.

These ministers also exploited the same rhetoric that Innocent III used so forcefully: the purification of the communal body. Their sermonizing expressed a “feeling that American purity was being contaminated by these alien groups,” especially with “such epithets as ‘stain’ or ‘cancer’ in the body politic, in reference to the Mormons,” in an attempt to persuade governments and individuals to “force Mormon conformity.”[60] The anti-Mormon ideological campaign proved successful in the end. In fall 1838, Missouri executive order #44 was issued. The orders from Governor Boggs stated “the Mormons must be treated as enemies, and must be exterminated or driven from the state if necessary for the public peace.”[61] This constituted “no ordinary military directive, but a call for the eradication of a distinct people whose very existence could no longer be tolerated.”[62] Only rescinded in 1976,[63] the order reflects the intensity of the persecuting society on the American frontier and the vehemence of early anti-Mormonism.

The general of the Missouri state militia informed the Mormons that “you need not expect any mercy, but extermination, for I am determined the governor’s orders shall be executed.”[64] Furthermore, as the heretics were so frequently compared to an infectious virus, many officers involved in the expulsion thought the Mormons and all those close them to needed to be eradicated, root and stem. One Missouri cornel during the massacre of Haun’s Mill ordered his men to “kill and scalp all, little and big: nits make lice.”[65] This is a horrifying (but likely unintentional) emulation of papal legate Arnaud Amalric, who ordered during the sack of Béziers, “Kill them all. God will know his own.”[66] The ideology of purification is powerful and dangerous, encouraging atrocities during the anti-heretical crusades in both Languedoc and Missouri.

Conclusion

There is a fundamental similarity in the crusader rhetoric used during the expulsion of the Mormons from Missouri and during the inquisition against the Cathars in the Albigensian Crusade. The disparate threads of 1838 and 1213 are connected by a common tapestry of sectarian violence and persecution of heretics in Christianity, which is largely rooted in ideological shifts that took place in the early 13th century under the papacy of Innocent III. Ultimately, the rhetorical, ideological, and liturgical trends of anti-heretical crusade are visible in the historical moments of both 13th century crusading Catholicism and 19th century migrating Mormonism, and two distant historical moments use similar ideas and methods in their efforts to both promote and defend against anti-heretical crusade.

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Uebel, Michael. “Unthinking the Monster: Twelfth-Century Responses to Saracen Alterity,” Monster Theory: Reading Culture, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen. (1996): 264-91.

Walker, Jeffrey N. “Mormon Land Rights in Caldwell and Daviess Counties and the Mormon Conflict of 1838: New Findings and New Understandings.” BYU Studies Quarterly 47, no. BYU Studies Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2008).

Winston, Kimberly. “Contested Sacred Space USA: Conflict And Cooperation In The Heartland – Religion News Service.” 2017.  Religion News Service. https://religionnews.com/2017/08/11/contested-sacred-space-usa-conflict-and-cooperation-in-the-heartland/. Accessed 7 Mar 2020.

  1. Reeve, W. Paul, and Ardis E. Parshall, eds. Mormonism: A Historical Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO, 2010. Pg. 103.
  2. Clayton, William (1814-1879). “Come, Come Ye Saints.” Manchester Hymnal, English. Salt Lake City, Utah, USA. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 1840. 1912, 25th Edition (last known). 385 songs. The lyrics were written in 1846.
  3. “Innocent III, Quia Maior, 1213.” As found in Bird, Jessalynn, Edward Peters, and James M. Powell, eds. Crusade and Christendom: Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall of Acre, 1187-1291. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. Accessed March 7, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fh9x5.
  4. Gaposchkin, M. Cecilia. “RESEARCH PROPOSAL: CRUSADE, LITURGY, IDEOLOGY, AND DEVOTION (1095-1400).” Neh.gov, Research Grant FB-56015-12. Pg. 1.
  5. Gaposchkin, M. Cecilia. Invisible weapons: liturgy and the making of crusade ideology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017.
  6. Moore, John, ed. Pope Innocent III and his world. Routledge, 2016. Ch. 22, pg. 1.
  7. Power, Daniel. “Who went on the Albigensian Crusade?.” The English Historical Review 128, no. 534 (2013): 1047-1085. Pg. 1076.
  8. Gaposchkin, Invisible Weapons, 203.
  9. Shannon, Albert Clement. The Popes and Heresy in the Thirteenth Century. Villanova, Pennsylvania: Augustinian Press, 1949. Pg. 37.
  10. Rist, Rebecca. “Salvation and the Albigensian Crusade: Pope Innocent III and the plenary indulgence.” Reading Medieval Studies 36 (2010): 95-112.
  11. Ephesians 4:9, The Bible, New International Version (NIV).
  12. Nickerson, Hoffman. The Inquisition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1923. Pg. 35.
  13. “Innocent III, Quia Maior, 1213.” In Crusade and Christendom: Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall of Acre, 1187-1291, edited by Bird Jessalynn, Peters Edward, and Powell James M., 107-12. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
  14. “Innocent III, Quia Maior, 1213,” in Crusade and Christendom, ed. Jessalyn et al.
  15. Ibid.
  16. Pope Innocent III, “Quia Maior,” Patrologia Latina, ed. Migne, vol. 216, col. 821.
  17. Ibid.
  18. Uebel, Michael. “Unthinking the Monster: Twelfth-Century Responses to Saracen Alterity,” Monster Theory: Reading Culture, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen. (1996): 264-91. Pg. 268.
  19. Baugh, Alexander L. “A call to arms: the 1838 Mormon defense of Northern Missouri.” PhD diss., Brigham Young University, 1996. Pg. 26.
  20. Bell, pg. 25.
  21. Left: From Milton-Edwards, Beverley. “Jerusalem: Securing Spaces In Holy Places.” Brookings, 201.. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/jerusalem-securing-spaces-in-holy-places/. Right: Winston, Kimberly. “Contested Sacred Space USA: Conflict And Cooperation In The Heartland – Religion News Service.” 2017. Religion News Service. https://religionnews.com/2017/08/11/contested-sacred-space-usa-conflict-and-cooperation-in-the-heartland/. Accessed 3/7/20.
  22. The Doctrine and Covenants of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Salt Lake City, UT: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1981. Section 57:1-2.
  23. Smith, Joseph Fielding. Life of Joseph F. Smith. Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1938. Pg. 340.
  24. Howlett, David J. Kirtland temple: The biography of a shared Mormon sacred space. University of Illinois Press, 2014.
  25. “Valley of God” in the Adamic language — Encyclopedia of Mormonism, Vol. 1, which cites Journal of Discourses 18:343 (Orson Pratt).
  26. “Adam-Ondi-Ahman.” Emp.Byui.Edu, 2020. http://emp.byui.edu/SATTERFIELDB/PDF/Quotes/Adam-ondi-Ahman.pdf. Accessed 6 Mar 2020.
  27. Winston, Kimberly. “Contested Sacred Space USA: Conflict And Cooperation In The Heartland – Religion News Service.” 2017. Religion News Service. https://religionnews.com/2017/08/11/contested-sacred-space-usa-conflict-and-cooperation-in-the-heartland/. Accessed 3/7/20.
  28. Bell, Angela. “Trouble in Zion: the radicalization of Mormon theology, 1831-1839.” PhD diss., University of Missouri–Columbia, 2017. Pg. 9.
  29. Gordon S. Wood, “Evangelical America and Early Mormonism,” New York History 61 (October 1980). Pg. 380.
  30. Crawley, Peter, and Richard L. Anderson. “The Political and Social Realities of Zion’s Camp.” Brigham Young University Studies 14, no. 4 (1974): 406-420.
  31. Daniel Ashby, James Keyte, and Sterling Price (Brunswick, Missouri), “Letter to Governor Lilburn W. Boggs” (Jefferson City, Missouri), September 1, 1838, in Mormon War Papers 1837-41, Missouri State Archives.
  32. “Petition to Congress,” The Latter-day Saint’s Millennial Star, No. 28, vol XVII. Saturday, July 14, 1855. Reprinted from the History of Joseph Smith, a copy of the ‘petition to Congress for redress of our Missouri difficulties.’
  33. “Polygamy and Utah,” The Latter-day Saint’s Millennial Star, No. 8, vol XVII. Saturday, February 24, 1855.
  34. Brown, Samuel Morris. In Heaven as It Is on Earth: Joseph Smith and the Early Mormon Conquest of Death. Oxford University Press, 2011. Pg. 289.
  35. Bird, Jessalynn, Edward Peters, and James M. Powell, eds. Crusade and Christendom: annotated documents in translation from Innocent III to the fall of Acre, 1187-1291. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. Pg. 454.
  36. Crandall, Marilyn J. “The Little and Gardner Hymnal, 1844: A Study of Its Origin and Contribution to the LDS Musical Canon.” Byu Studies, vol. 44, no. 3, 2005, pp. 136–160. Pg. 138.
  37. Bell, pg. 2.
  38. Daviess County Circuit Court Records, C2690, p. 3.
  39. Matthew 5:13, The Bible, King James Version (KJV).
  40. Daviess County Circuit Court Records, C2690, p. 4
  41. Frampton, T. Ward. “’Some Savage Tribe’: Race, Legal Violence, and the Mormon War of 1838.” Journal of Mormon History 40, no. 1 (2014): 175-207. Pg. 194.

  42. The Doctrine and Covenants of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Salt Lake City, UT: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1981. Section 52:42.
  43. Bird, Jessalynn, Edward Peters, and James M. Powell, eds. Crusade and Christendom: annotated documents in translation from Innocent III to the fall of Acre, 1187-1291. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. Pg. 40.
  44. Bird et al, pg. 5.
  45. Frampton, pg. 195.
  46. Largey, Zachary L. “The Rhetoric of Persecution: Mormon Crisis Rhetoric from 1838-1871.” (2006). Theses and Dissertations, Brigham Young University. Pg. 67.
  47. “History, 1838–1856, volume A-1 [23 December 1805–30 August 1834],” p. 475, The Joseph Smith Papers, accessed March 4, 2020. https://www.josephsmithpapers.org/paper-summary/history-1838-1856-volume-a-1-23-december-1805-30-august-1834/481.
  48. Grua, David W., “Memoirs of the Persecuted: Persecution, Memory, and the West as a Mormon Refuge” (2008). Theses and Dissertations, Brigham Young University. Pg. 17.
  49. Grua, pg. 17.
  50. Grow, Matthew J.. “The Suffering Saints: Thomas L. Kane, Democratic Reform, and the Mormon Question in Antebellum America.” Journal of the Early Republic 29 (2009): 681 – 710. Pg. 682.
  51. Cordon, Alfred. “Times and Seasons, 16 May 1842, vol 3, no 14” p. 793, The Joseph Smith Papers, accessed March 4, 2020, https://www.josephsmithpapers.org/paper-summary/times-and-seasons-16-may-1842/11
  52. Cordon, Alfred, “Times and Seasons,” p. 793, The Joseph Smith Papers.
  53. Hicks, Michael. Mormonism and music: A history. Vol. 489. University of Illinois Press, 2003. Pg. 20, quoting Alexander Campbell.
  54. Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay. The History of the Albigensian Crusade. Edited and translated by W. A. Sibly and M. D. Sibly. Woodbridge, UK: 1998. §226. Pg. 116. Continued quote: “…, those who recited the psalms more than those who attacked them, those who prayed more than those who sought to wound.”
  55. O’Carroll, Michael. Veni Creator Spiritus: A Theological Encyclopedia of the Holy Spirit. Liturgical Press, 1990. Pg. 65.
  56. Alexander, John Kimball. “Tarred and Feathered: Mormons, Memory, and Ritual Violence.” PhD diss., Department of History, University of Utah, 2012. Pg. 8.
  57. Moore, Robert I. The formation of a persecuting society: authority and deviance in Western Europe 950-1250. John Wiley & Sons, 2008. Pg.
  58. Cannon, Mark W. “The crusades against the Masons, Catholics, and Mormons: Separate waves of a common current.” Brigham Young University Studies 3, no. 2 (1961): 23-40. Pg. 23.
  59. Cannon, pg. 26.
  60. Cannon, pg. 36.
  61. Hartley, William G. “Missouri’s 1838 Extermination Order and the Mormons’ Forced Removal to Illinois.” Mormon Historical Studies 2, no. 1 (2001): 5-27. Pg. 5.
  62. Frampton, pg. 196.
  63. Brandon G. Kinney. The Mormon War: Zion and the Missouri Extermination Order of 1838. Yardley, Penn.: Westholme Publishing, 2011. 236 pp. Notes, bibliography, index, photographs, maps.
  64. Hartley, Pg. 5.
  65. Frampton, pg. 197.
  66. Sibly, W.A.; Sibly, M.D. (2003). The Chronicle of William of Puylaurens: The Albigensian Crusade and Its Aftermath. Woodbridge, Suffolk, England, UK: The Boydell Press. pp. 127–128.
Categories
Essays Philosophy Religion & Spirituality

Sounds of Silence

“Miracles are explainable; it is the explanations that are miraculous.”

— Tim Robinson

Ineffable: a word for the unexplainable sacred, the glorious unspeakable, the venerated bits of life we cannot vocalize. My thesis: all experience is ineffable, and therefore the only honest response to existence is silence. But what kind of silence?

The word ineffable prompts images of burning-bush visions, ayahuasca-spawned dreams, the overwhelming encounter with the Sublime, the Absolute, God, Infinity. This meaning rushes down the calcified canyons of our sandstone sulci and gneissic gyri; a flash flood in our brain’s labyrinth of slot canyons, washing away other possible meanings of the word.

body of water on ridge between two rock formations

Yet all experience is ineffable, not only the transcendent bits. For example, walk down the beverages aisle of a store. You cannot describe the taste of each drink, from orange juice to milk, any more than you can explain the sight of red to a blind person. Your mouth has an arrangement of taste buds no one else possesses, and you have an immense set of unique memories and emotional associations with each taste.[1] Where else have you tasted this flavor? What music was playing? What were you feeling? All these factors and countless more influence taste. For example, many Americans say pumpkin soup tastes like home. A simple broth is wired in the brain to an inexpressible feeling. We have agreed on four letters for this feeling – h o m e – and think we are all speaking of the same thing. Words package experiences the same way containers package tastes. It is important to remember the word is not the experience just as the container is not the taste.

If you are still in the store, look at the packaging. Each branded bottle, from Odwalla to Honest Tea to Coke, contains an indescribable taste. The store is also a package, made of concrete, rebar, and fluorescent lights rather than clear plastic. It is a package for packages. The city wraps the store, the store wraps the fridges, the fridges wrap the containers, and each container wraps a liquid. Words are also just packages upon packages. Like the bottle around the drink, simple onomatopoeias wrap an experience directly: “oof,” “roar,” “agh.” To neologize more, we then wrap these building-block words with drier words, more distant from direct experience. As Nietzsche describes this wrapping process,

“It is this way with all of us concerning language; we believe that we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things–metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities.”[2]

All words are flimsy metaphors, wrapping-paper around incommunicable experiences. Attempting to equate your experience with another after hearing their words is like saying two boxes have identical contents after seeing only their drab cardboard facades. At the apex of the packaging of experience, we reach the wasteful white-speak of academia: demonstration, consultation, nonetheless, domain, intersection, paradigm, ultimately. The same drive that makes us manufacture endless plastic leads us to create ever more words as wrapping. Concision is resistance to word waste as recycling is resistance to plastic waste.

blue labeled plastic bottles

To read is to hear the crinkle of wrapping-paper, to feel the dry cardboard we use to wrap up amorphous existence. How do we force the living substrate of experience into inanimate paper? If experience is ineffable, how do we eff it? This is the miracle of language. With each movement of our mouths we create words from a wordless world as a god creates form from formless void. Barrow begins his work with the simple phrase: “deciding on a book’s beginning is as complex as determining the origins of the universe.” Each moment involves trillions of interacting particles, endless emotions we can’t understand or communicate, and the culmination of millennia of biological, physical, and cultural histories. And even as we try to come up with a word, the moment has already passed: words are reactive and reflective, not simultaneous with experience. Just as a cartographer always maps a territory after exploring it, we always describe our existence after experiencing it. In this sense experience is an ever-moving eel and language is our attempt to pin it down. Yet we can almost instantaneously stick labels to our experiences. How do we apply glue and paper to a nebulous, fleeting eel?

All words are labels on the un-labelable, incomplete metaphors. In this sense, all words are lies. This is the draw to a vow of silence. If the sacred is inexpressible, then attempting to express it is defilement. And if speech is not the defilement of some religious or transcendent concept, then at least it is a betrayal the self, a reckless revealing of the sacred internal:

“Speech…is essentially a public act. It is an act necessarily objective and universal. To speak is to give up one’s individuality in order to reveal oneself in the universals of language. One strips oneself of idiosyncrasies, and ultimately, if set on verbalizing all experience, one strips experience itself of any content…which does not fit the structure of language.”[3]

Monastic silence’s appeal is its protection of the sacred and the understanding that comes with freedom from linguistic structure. Just as some call upon God to fill gaps in our knowledge, some monks might argue God occupies the gaps in our speech. In his book The Power of Silence: Against the Dictatorship of Noise, Cardinal Robert Sarah argues exactly this: “silence is not an absence. On the contrary, it is the manifestation of a presence, the most intense of all presences.”[4] Sociological research into an order of Benedictine nuns who live by the credo “Silence is a beautiful hymn we sing to God” found that their silence reduces “verbal competitiveness (jostling for attention in conversations) and increases sincerity and empathy in their rare conversations.[5] Silence opens up new routes to unspoken communication.

woman standing beside body of calm water

Words are to teeth as silence is to the tongue. When we use words, we are forced to bite down on an idea. Our teeth are tools to cut comestibles up into atoms, break them apart so our saliva can pour into the gaps and begin the analytic chemical dismantling of the object. We crunch the item under the strength of our ivory incisors just as we confine a concept into crisp, monochrome, 12-point words. But we must let some ideas rest on the roof of our mouths, push them with the tongue rather than biting or swallowing. Using the tongue well allows us to explore rather than vanquish. Just as we cannot see the grandeur of the Grand Canyon by breaking it into discrete units of property, drawing lines and ripping it apart in search for extractable resources, we cannot conquer a concept. We must seduce it, and seduction is the art of the tongue. When we use words, we put ourselves in the same hell as Tantalus. His curse was that he needed to eat, to force his mandibles upon nutrients, and never have his hunger sated. Chomping down on ideas will prevent us from reaching filling understanding.

photo of shouting horse under cloudy sky

Poetry and silence allow us to abandon the urge to bite and begin to glory in the mysteries and paradoxes of life. Where the logician tortures herself, the poet revels. It is easy to dismiss myth, story, parable, and poetry as unverifiable rubbish, meaningless language that should not be pursued as its referents cannot be demonstrated. But perhaps these forms of expression are just using the tongue rather than the teeth:

“The fact that religions through the ages have spoken in images, parables, and paradoxes means simply that there are no other ways of grasping the reality to which they refer. But that does not mean that it is not a genuine reality. And splitting this reality into an objective and a subjective side won’t get us very far.”[6]

A monk with a vow of silence does not verbalize her reason for quiet. Doing so would break her vow. Rather, she expresses as the trees: through whispering of aspens, the listening of tranquil oaks, the mosaic of sunlight marbled by the veins of leaves. For her, poetry is not a poem, an iterative list of words. Poetry is a life lived, the ineffable complexity of moment upon moment. As C.S. Lewis writes in Prince Caspian —

“‘Oh, Trees, Trees, Trees,” said Lucy (though she had not been intending to speak at all). ‘Oh, Trees, wake, wake, wake. Don’t you remember it? Don’t you remember me? Dryads and Hamadryads, come to me.’ Though there was not a breath of wind they all stirred about her. The rustling noise of the leaves was almost like words … Lucy felt that at any moment she would begin to understand what the trees were trying to say. But the moment did not come. The rustling died away … Yet Lucy had the feeling (as you sometimes do when you are trying to remember a name or a date and almost get it, but it vanishes before you really do) that she had just missed something.”[7]

bare trees

This is the same feeling we get when we try to grasp Nothing. We immerse ourselves in the concept, and at moments we feel we are onto something. We might think we have the Absolute in our teeth, gripped and white-knuckled. It is pinned down. Nothing named. The ethereal explained. All systems united into a grand Theory of Everything. Then somehow the silence vanishes, and our understanding goes with it.

Silence is not the mere negation of words, not-speaking. Just as there are many tones of voice, there are shades of silence. We can practice dismissive silence, to communicate rejection: the silence of an angry lover, or an academic who does not speak on unverifiable topics he considers unimportant. There is silence as a symbol of apathy, the silence of a bored student. There is the raised-hand silence of the impatient on the edge of speech. There is the silence of staring at the stars, silence as a symbol of deep appreciation of the natural world. We can use silence to communicate confusion, reflection, sleep, hatred, fear, and countless more. Silence, as it often contains more meaningful content, can be louder than speech. And silence is often more difficult than speech. Even when our mouths are not moving, we squish silence in our brains before it can begin to grow, noticing something, anything, and if it is not there — we generate it.

As modern humans and especially as inhabitants of the academic tower, we are trained in symbolic languages. We learn to write code, uncover literary motifs, dissect art, communicate with multiple languages, to create mathematical models to simplify the world and machines to simplify our interactions with it. In other words, we understand the signifiers, but we rarely delve into the signified. Sometimes we forget there is an ineffable reality beyond the symbolic languages we are trained to manipulate. Silence is the escape from this symbolic economy. Silence does not demand using symbols, applying labels, or biting down on ideas.

photo of open book

This essay argues that all experience is ineffable. As ineffable means inexpressible and sacred, using language to convey experience utters the unutterable and violates the sacred. Silence allows us to avoid this violation, and to communicate and listen in ways that are preempted by the spoken and written word.

To conclude? Conclusion is as impossible as beginning.

FOOTNOTES
  1. Harry T. Lawless, Hildegarde Heymann. Sensory Evaluation of Food: Principles and Practices. Springer Science: New York, New York 1999. Print.

  2. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Taylor Carman. On Truth and Untruth: Selected Writings. Harper Perennial, 2010. Print.

  3. Crumbine, Nancy. On Silence. Humanitas, v.XI, no.2 (l975), 147-165. Print.

  4. Cardinal Robert Sarah, Nicolas Diat. The Power of Silence: Against the Dictatorship of Noise. Libraire Artheme Fayard: Paris, France 2016. Print.

  5. Wichroski, Mary Anne. Breaking Silence: Some Fieldwork Strategies in Cloistered and Non-Cloistered Communities. Qualitative Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1996. Print.

  6. Bohr, Neils and Maria Popova. “Nobel-Winning Physicist Niels Bohr on Subjective vs. Objective Reality and the Uses of Religion in a Secular World.” BrainPickings.org. N.d. Web. 21 Apr 2019.

  7. Lewis, C. S. (Clive Staples), 1898-1963. Prince Caspian: The Return to Narnia. New York, N.Y.: Collier Books, 19701951. Print.

Categories
Essays Philosophy Religion & Spirituality Uncategorized

Poverty as Wealth

Written for Seminar: Into the Silence w/ Prof Huntington / 5.6.201 

“Poverty is a virtue which one can teach oneself.” — Diogenes of Sinope

Taneda Santōka echoes this sentiment throughout For All My Walking, an unassuming manual for practicing the virtue of poverty. Wandering in ascetic indigence gives Santōka unique insights to expand his understanding of Buddhism. His homelessness allows him to see decadent Japanese society through the eyes of the poverty-stricken. Santōka is therefore part of a tradition of Zen Buddhist thinkers who do not fulfill any orthodox metric of success — stability, academic respect, status, health, long-term relationships, or wealth — but are admired in Japan for their authenticity and wisdom. In this sense, the homeless Santōka is meaningfully employed: he provides essential reflections on the life of a destitute poet.

 

The origins and nature of Santōka’s poverty

Santōka was not born into poverty. His family epitomizes the Japanese aphorism Oya kurō suru, ko raku suru, mago kojiki suru (“The parent works hard, the child takes it easy and the grandchild begs”), as his father inherited and squandered a fortune.[1] His bourgeois childhood is visible in this early poem from 1911: “In a café we debate decadence a summer butterfly flits” (Hiroaki 23). The irony is glaring here: in a café, a symbol of affluence, a group of wealthy students discuss decadence. The season phrase in the haiku, “summer butterfly flits,” is also a symbol of fluttering and trivial leisure. At only 29, Santōka has piercing insights into the contradictions of the class he was born into.

The voice of this carefree Santōka is rarely audible in his later writings. By the years of For All My Walking, he thinks of himself as “nothing but a beggar-monk” (Taneda, 42). Several processes brought Santōka down from the moneyed pinnacles of Japanese society, but there were two key turning points: (a) his mother’s suicide, and (b) the bankruptcy of his father’s sake brewery. The psychological trauma of these events and the loss of his family’s wealth preceded a crushing sequence of tragedies. Over the next five years, Santōka’s brother committed suicide, his grandmother died, he left his family to find work in Tokyo, and then he divorced his wife. Finally, the last living remnant of Santōka’s old life, his father, perished in 1920.

But the trauma did not die. It haunted Santōka for the rest of his life. He was left with at least two psychological ghosts that impeded him from conventional success: first, his near addiction to sake, and second, a severe mood disorder. The ghost of sake is one of the recurring threads in Santōka’s work. As he summarizes his view of the substance For All My Walking,

I like sake so I’m not going to give it up and that’s that—nothing to be done about it. But drinking sake—how much merit do I acquire doing that? If I let sake get the best of me, then I’m a slave to sake, in other words, a hopeless case! (Santōka, 48)

He seems less self-aware of the second ghost, although it is apparent in his works. As the translator writes, “from a mood of elation he sinks into all-but-suicidal despair” (22). Many of his poems are cheerful observations on the sublime beauty of nature or the kindness of humans. Others condemn the futility of existence: “Flypaper / no outs— / yell in a loud voice / till you’re dead” (70). This “nervous disability” impaired Santōka endlessly, from his brief stint in academia to his marriage (16). The twin demons of sake and manic-depressive disorder cling to both Santōka’s life and his poetry.

Debilitating psychological ghosts and the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” thwarted Santōka forays into normal careers. He was therefore pushed to live in reflective, meandering poverty: “Talentless and incompetent as I am, there are two things I can do, and two things only: walk, and compose poems” (20). His poverty is both a symptom and a cause of his poetry — he is a poet because he cannot make money, and he cannot make money because he is a poet. Or perhaps both have a common root in the trauma and tragedy that marred his life. Regardless: after leaving the monastery, Santōka lived the rest of his days in poverty and poetry.

The value of poverty in For All My Walking

woman wearing orange and white kimono dress standing near the house

Although Buddhism taught him detachment from material possessions, Santōka struggled to accept being a mendicant poet. Sometimes he waxes grateful about this austere life: “when I think of it / the life I live / is way better than I deserve” (43). But he often subjects himself to intense diatribes. At one point he expresses that he would prefer starvation: “Even if it means nothing to eat, I don’t want to do any more of that hateful begging!” (67). He even questions whether he deserves the sporadic charity he receives:

“Stop to think about it, I’m not qualified to receive alms. Only those of the level of arhat or above are entitled to. So it’s only natural that I meet with refusal. If I do my begging with this much understanding and resignation, then begging will become a kind of religious practice” (68).

This passage illustrates a broader theme in Santōka’s life: his use of Buddhism to understand and improve himself. He tempers each of his brutal self-critiques with some fragment of Buddhist philosophy. In this way, his everyday encounter with poverty encourages Santōka to delve into Buddhism. As he walks through the physical world of Japan, tasting diverse dialects and mountains, he also walks through the conceptual world of Buddhism and the emotional world within himself.

Much of the profundity of For All My Walking comes from Santōka’s experience with poverty. For example, this shining piece touches on individualism, summarizes the common view on poverty, and adds Santōka’s honest self-analysis:

“Nothing for me to do but go my own way. My own way—that’s unconditional. Without noticing, without realizing, I’ve let myself get slovenly. I’ve gotten used to being given things and forgotten about giving. I make things easy for myself, and I despair of myself. It’s all right to be poor, but not to stink of poverty.” (75)

It is unclear whether Santōka is expressing his own opinion or repeating some bromide about the “slovenly poor” he internalized during his stint in the leisure class. But the writing is extremely nuanced. Santōka is lauding the need to live his own life, the artist against the world. However, he also rejects the urge to let himself go and become slovenly – allowing sake, laziness, and self-pity to consume his mind. This complex thinking, simply expressed and inspired by poverty, is one of Santōka’s distinguishing marks.

Furthermore, Santōka’s poverty allows him to juxtapose the Japanese leisure class with the backbreaking paucity of the lower class. For example, he reflects on quotidian economic injustices: “a day laborer sweating from morning to evening, if a man makes 80 sen, if a woman, 50 sen” (43). He also sees the painful mundanity of the “Elevator girl” spending her exuberant youth “going up going down / saying the same words over and over / the long long day” (107). I have felt this deadening routine of menial labor. Santōka could have written a similar haiku about the modern world: “Drive thru girl / opens window, closes window / the same packaged meals and words / to car after car / the long long day.” Ultimately, Santoka realizes there is “no help / for the likes of me,” and therefore decides to “go on walking” (23). This is the tragedy of those who fall through the cracks of society and have no recompense.[2] These lines also show the power of haiku: rich observations channeled into a few lines can have immense impact.

Japan was a profoundly stratified society during Santōka’s life. The graph on the right comes from a paper on income inequality that reinforces Santoka’s observations, finding that “a degree of income concentration was extremely high throughout the pre-WWII period during which the nation underwent rapid industrialization” (Moriguchi, 2). Many of his writings reflect this broad trend with small but effective on-the-ground observations of poverty in Japan. However, Santōka did not use his haiku for social activism. Perhaps that is left as an exercise for the reader.

Furthermore, Santōka’s poverty expands his gratitude. This can be summarized in a single poem: “there were hands / to scratch / the itchy places” (24). Santōka had many itchy places: poverty, problems in Japan, nagging innkeepers, annoying traveling companions, straw hats leaking,[3] trauma from his past, his volatile mood, and many more. But he is grateful for his means of overcoming itches: the method of Buddhism, the outlet of haiku, and the escape of sake. He has hands with which to scratch.

person's hand in shallow focus

Seeking to create economic value can inhibit candid reflection. His intentional poverty frees Santōka from this pursuit. As such, he can reflect upon nature instead of viewing it as a means of production: “Westerners try to conquer the mountains / people of the East contemplate the mountains / patiently I taste the mountains” (44). Santōka can taste nature fully because he has no need to consume it. And as he is not seeking employment or relying on patronage, he can speak his mind and avoid being another regurgitator of platitudes: “If there is anything good in my life — or I should say, good in my poems — it comes from the fact that they are not contrived, they tell few lies, they’re never forced” (77). Nomadic poverty is vital to Santōka’s wisdom, as it frees him from the economic rat-race.

Finally, Santōka’s poems are primarily descriptive and not prescriptive. Much of the simple beauty of the book comes from judgement-free musings. He does not have wealth, power, or great status, and therefore does not have the high ground to be moralistic. As such, he makes observations instead of judgements, and emphasizes rather than criticizes. Like Herman Melville, he realizes that “Of all the preposterous assumptions of humanity over humanity, nothing exceeds most of the criticisms made on the habits of the poor by the well-housed, well-warmed, and well-fed.” His poverty therefore frees Santōka from the pressure to evaluate, manipulate, or make judgements upon other people and existence itself.

We have investigated the causes and characteristics of Santōka’s poverty as well as its unique value. Through his begging Santōka learns the arts of humility, compassion, social criticism, judgement-free reflection, and self-acceptance. These virtues are so difficult to attain it is no wonder that “it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.”[4] Santōka ultimately realizes he has to unapologetically embrace his destitution, writing that “People are happiest when they can be who they really are. A beggar has to learn to be an all-out beggar” (65). This authentic self-embracement becomes Santōka’s simple justification for his life: “by venturing to do something so ludicrous as walking in the modern world, I, who am not very clever, justify my existence” (45). Conclusively, poverty contains a wealth of understanding.

WORKS CITED

Sato, Hiroaki (2002). Grass and Tree Cairn. Winchester, VA: Red Moon Press. Print.

Santōka, Taneda (2003). For All My Walking. Translated by Burton Watson. Columbia University Press. Print.

Santōka, Taneda. Walking By My Self Again. Translated by Scott Watson. Bookgirl Press, 2011. Print.

Chappelow, Jim. “Gini Coefficient.” Investopedia.com. 15 Apr 2019. Web. 7 May 2019.

Moriguchi, Chiaki and Emmanuel Saez. The Evolution of Income Concentration in Japan, 1885

2002: Evidence from Income Tax Statistics. Boston University Press: Boston, MA. Print.

FOOTNOTES
  1. See page 12 of For All My Walking — “His father seems to have been a rather weak-willed man who spent his time dabbling in local politics, chasing after women, and in general dissipating the family fortune, which had been of considerable size at the time he fell heir to it.”

  2. This understanding comes from his poverty: he sees the ways he is marginalized and has empathy for those who are also marginalized. He recognizes that it is almost impossible to understand this perspective from the outside —”People who have never done any begging seem to have difficulty understanding how I feel about this” (67). Siddhartha Gautama himself could not understand poverty until personally witnessing it outside his palace.

  3. “What, even my straw hat has started leaking” — Santōka, Walking By My Self Again, pg 22.

  4. Matthew 19:23-26.

Categories
Essays Philosophy Religion & Spirituality

The Incompatibility of Kantianism and Christianity

Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.

— Matthew 5:48

I’m about to argue that one cannot be a Christian and a Kantian at the same time. Before I do that, we’ll need some definitions: First, as deontology, or duty-based ethics, is a broad field, I’ll limit it to Kantian deontology, as set forth in the Metaphysics of Morals. Second, Christianity will be defined as belief in Yawheh; the deific nature, atonement, and resurrection of Jesus; and a general belief in the truth of the Old and New Testaments. Now on to the argument.


Summary 

1. The Christian God does not act immorally; he is morally perfect.

2. The morally perfect Christian God performed the Atonement of Jesus Christ.

3. The Atonement of Jesus Christ is immoral under a Kantian framework.

4. Thus, Christians may not be Kantians and maintain rational consistency.


Premise one: The Christian God does not act immorally.

As shown in the opening quote, the Bible frequently repeats that God is perfect, and it supplicates God’s followers to strive to be perfect like him (Deuteronomy 18:13 is another good example, though it is ironic, considering the atrocities committed by God in that same book). Furthermore, moral perfection is one of the defining aspects of the concept of God; if God is not morally perfect, then why call him God? Why not just an advanced human? An omniscient being would necessarily know all things, including the nature of morality, and an omnibenevolent being would necessarily follow the nature of morality.


Premise two: The morally perfect Christian God performed the Atonement of Jesus Christ. 

This is not very controversial, though it gets slightly strange if you are trinitarian, considering the whole ‘God sacrificing himself and then praying to himself on the cross’ deal. The only controversy may arise around how exactly God went around performing it; was it God who did it, or was it Jesus for the sake of God, or was it Jesus’ singular choice? And how much choice, exactly, did Jesus have? He was most certainly coerced, after all, by the fact that everyone’s souls would be set on fire if he didn’t atone for them. Like the coward that I am, I’ll avoid these questions by simply saying that God caused the Atonement to happen by integrating it into his plan. Again, there is the question of how much choice God had in creating the plan, but regardless, he created the plan, and that inevitably led to the Atonement.

Crucifix statue

Premise three: The Atonement of Jesus Christ is deontologically immoral. 

It is quite clear that Kantian deontology would rule the Atonement immoral. The Atonement distinctly violates the primary principle of Kantianism: we should never act in such a way that we treat others as a mere means to an end. It is using Christ as a mere means to an end, primarily as an instrument for the benefit of the vast majority. I do not mean ‘mere’ as a derogatory term, but rather as a philosophical condition: mere as in ‘little more than as specified.’ The Atonement, after all, was not a mere act, but a pivotal point in Christian theology.  However, it is almost universally recognized that Christ was never an end, but that he was always a means. After all, he was called the Lamb for a reason: he was a sacrifice for the sake of others. He offered all of his glory unto his father. This is the type of ‘sacrifice of the minority for the majority’ situation that Kantians condemn. Christ went through horrific tortures, suffering  the pain of literally everyone, so that the sins of humanity could be erased. This is permissible under a teleological moral framework, where the means can be justified by its ends, but abhorrent under a deontological, and especially Kantian, moral framework.


Conclusion: Christians may not be Kantians and maintain rational consistency. 

One who believes in a morally perfect God must also model his/her morality around this God. Any action that this God performs is necessarily good, and so mortals cannot deny the morality of the action and must, instead, agree with it. It would be irrational and contradictory to say that a morally perfect God did something immoral. If the Atonement is immoral under a Kantian framework, then either God is morally imperfect, the Kantian framework is false, or God does not exist. Only one of these options allows one to retain their status as a Christian, which I defined as one who believes in a morally perfect God, among other things. The other option is to believe that Kantianism is false.


Possible criticisms 

1. God and humans have different moral standards. It is justified for God to kill, but it is not justified for humans to do so. It is justified for God to bystand in the face of suffering, but it is not justified for humans to do so. Thus, we do not have to base our morality on God’s.

2. Kant’s morality is only for autonomous wills (Stanford), and God did not have any choice in the Atonement. It was a necessary aspect of the universe. Thus, he was not an autonomous will, and he was not making the sort of act that Kantianism applies to.


References

Deuteronomy 18:13 – Thou shalt be perfect with the Lord thy God.

Kant’s Moral Philosophy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published in 2004; substantive revision in 2008.